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Privilege in Dispute: Economic and Political Change and Caste 
Relations in Tamil Nadu Early in the 21st Century1 
 
In January 2015 the Tamil writer, Perumal Murugan, was subjected to so much abuse 
both by his fellow citizens and by officials in the town of Tiruchengode in which he lived, as to 
have led him to announce his ‘death’ as a writer and his intention of renouncing his craft. The 
case attracted international attention. Murugan’s crime? That he had ‘insulted’ Hinduism 
(according to a local functionary of the RSS), and dishonoured women of the Kongu Vellalar 
Gounder caste, the community that has been historically dominant in the region of the town. This 
because of a novel that he had written, published four years earlier, without comment from 
anyone in the locality. The attack on Perumal Murugan was orchestrated by caste organisations 
that remained in the shadows. Their hostility towards him reflected, another Tamil writer, V. 
Geetha, observed in a commentary, the discontent and frustration  of ‘disgruntled peasants and 
aspirational small town men, employed in an amorphous service sector’, which found an outlet 
‘in a politics of identity that is vacuous but in an immediate sense compensatory’ The caste 
organizations, she argued, ‘provide a sense of “home” and illusive belonging in a political 
economy that is competitive, divisive and extractive’ (2015: 18). 
The attack on Perumal Murugan is just one rather specific instance of the intensity of 
caste feeling in the state of Tamil Nadu. In this case it was evidently intensified by the 
involvement of the RSS – a reminder that Tamil Nadu is not at all immune to the politics of 
Hindutva.2 This seems remarkable in several ways. For one, the politics of the state have been 
dictated for half a century now by political parties that have their origins in the Dravidian 
movement, which was built up around an ideology articulated by E.V. Ramaswamy Naicker, 
known as ‘Periyar’ (meaning: ‘Great Man’), that was explicitly and forcefully secular, 
                                                          
1 I am very grateful to Christopher Fuller, Hugo Gorringe, Nate Roberts and Rupa Viswanath for their very helpful 
comments on drafts of this paper, and to Judith Heyer, Grace Carswell and Geert De Neve for sharing their work 
with me. 
2  See Harriss (2002) for commentary on Hindutva politics in Tamil Nadu around the turn of the century. There are 
clear indications of the strengthening of Hindu nationalist sentiments in the state in the context of Narendra Modi’s 
premiership after the general election of 2014. 
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rationalist, anti-religion – EVR was especially critical of Hinduism – and anti-caste. Then, Tamil 
Nadu has achieved a notable reputation in recent years as a progressive state that combines both 
high levels of human development and of economic growth. What accounts therefore, for the 
proliferation of caste-based political parties in the state over the past twenty years or so – seven 
such parties were formed, for instance, in the 12 months before the state assembly elections of 
2001 – and for the significance of the sort of casteism reflected in the actions against Perumal 
Murugan? How have caste relations been affected by the economic and political changes that 
have taken place in Tamil society? These are questions that are taken up in this essay. Further, I 
will comment from the experience of Tamil Nadu on recent arguments concerning the decline of 
hierarchy and the importance instead of ‘difference’ in caste and social relations.  
Caste and Class in Tamil Nadu 
Tamil Nadu has been the site both of a remarkable corpus of village-based studies of 
caste, class, religion and politics,3 and of historical studies.4 These show up marked differences 
in local caste structures. In contrast with the neighbouring states of Karnataka and Andhra 
Pradesh, in each of which two jati groups (or in the Andhra case, three), enjoy dominance (in the 
sense in which this term has been used by anthropologists5) in large areas, dominance is much 
more fragmented in Tamil Nadu. As Washbrook put it ‘No single caste was preponderant over an 
area equivalent to more than one British district, and usually it was much less’ (1989: 223). Even 
in the western districts of the state where the Kongu Vellalar Gounders have historically 
exercised dominance over a large area, there were also villages in which Kammavar Naidus (of 
Telugu origin) were dominant. Similarly, in the north of the state, though Mudaliars and Telugu-
speaking Naidus and Reddiars are powerful in different tracts, Vanniyars are more numerous and 
                                                          
 
3 A list of some of the more outstanding of these would include work by Beck (1972), Beteille (1965), Gough (1981, 
1989), Harriss (1982), Mencher (1978), Sivertsen (1963). There are also the so-called ‘Slater village studies’, 
referring to studies conducted in five Tamil villages on several occasions since the first surveys were made by 
students of the professor of economics in the University of Madras, Gilbert Slater, in 1916-17. See Harriss et al. 
(2010, 2012) 
4 See especially Baker (1984) and Ludden (1985). Washbrook (1989) provides an interesting discussion of their 
analyses.  
5 The idea of the ‘dominant caste’ was first expounded by Srinivas (1959). 
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though considered to be low-ranking, are sometimes locally the dominant caste. In the south 
those from the caste cluster that is now usually designated as Thevar are commonly dominant, 
though there are parts where their hegemony is challenged by historically ‘untouchable’ (Dalit, 
or Scheduled Caste, as they are now known) Pallars. 
There are regional patterns, and it has become conventional to distinguish especially 
between the river valleys and the ‘plains’ between them, sometimes expressed in terms of the 
distinction between the ‘wet’ and the ‘dry’ because of the more extensive irrigation of the former 
regions, and the greater dependence on rainfed agriculture in the latter. The society of the 
valleys, the areas of high Tamil culture, based on intensive paddy cultivation, is presided over by 
farming communities, generically Vellalars, with – historically – a significant Brahmin presence, 
a range of service castes, including those such as Acharis (carpenters, blacksmiths, goldsmiths), 
oil pressers and potters, as well as barbers and washermen, and a large agricultural labour force 
made up predominantly by ‘untouchables’6. The plains, for long forested and exploited mainly 
for grazing, were brought under more extensive cultivation ‘partly by the immigration and 
settlement of Telugu warrior chiefs and clans’ (Baker 1984: 40) in the Vijayanagara era. This 
was the case of the village of Iruvelpattu, for example, and of others in the area of Villupuram, 
where Telugu-speaking Reddiars have long been dominant (Harriss et al 2010: 48). Organized 
around peasant clans, who combined farming with warfare, plains society included fewer 
Brahmins and relatively fewer untouchables. ‘Outside agriculture, there was a diverse set of 
economic opportunities, involving artisanal, pastoralist and merchant groups’ (Washbrook 1989: 
223). 
Data based on the Census of 1891, presented by Baker (1984: 55), show that Brahmins 
made up only a very small proportion of the population of the Tamil districts7 – three per cent 
overall, though going up to six per cent in the Kaveri river valley and its delta (the former 
Thanjavur district) – the core of the society of the valleys. Fuller and Narasimhan, more recently, 
have noted that in 1931 the Brahmin population in the Tamil Districts was only 2.5 per cent of 
                                                          
6 A classic source is: Burton Stein (1968) ‘Brahman and Peasant in Early South Indian History’, Adyar Library 
Bulletin, 31-32: 229-69. 
7 And, contrary to Dravidianist stereotypes, the majority of agricultural lands were owned by non-Brahmins. 
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the total (78 per cent of them being Tamil Brahmins and 11 per cent Telugu Brahmins, the 
largest minority; Fuller and Narasimhan 2014: 231). This marks an important difference from 
large parts of North India, where Brahmins often constitute a larger share of the population. 
Washbrook went so far as to argue that not only was ‘Tamil Nadu’s “caste system” … very 
different from that of Northern and Brahmanic tradition’ but that it perhaps came ‘to be 
considered a “caste system” at all more because of the activities of nineteenth century orientalist 
scholars [and bureaucrats] than because of anything else’ (1989: 221). The Tamil country 
generally lacked jatis that claimed either Kshatriya or Vaishya status (though some have done so 
in the more recent past), so that all non-Brahmin castes, other than the outcastes, were classified 
as Shudras. Scholars, such as Beteille, have long considered that ‘The population of Tamil Nadu 
can be broadly divided into three groups, the Brahmins, the Non-Brahmins, and the Harijans (or 
Adi-Dravidas)’ (Beteille 1991: 85) – or as he says elsewhere ‘Brahmins, Shudras and 
Panchamas’8 (1991: 87). Earlier, in the 19th century, these distinctions appeared in Caldwell’s 
classic Comparative Grammar of the Dravidian or South Indian Family of Languages, where, in 
an appendix, the author felt compelled to address the question of whether Paraiyars and other 
outcastes were really Dravidian. Caldwell remarks that the usual linguistic practice amongst 
speakers of Dravidian languages (not just Tamil) was to use the ‘national name’ in a way that 
reflected a three-fold distinction: ‘a Tamilan … is neither a Brahmin, nor a member of any of the 
inferior castes, but a Dravidian sudra’ (Caldwell 1875: 549).9 
The tripartite schema does clearly show up the broad difference between the caste 
structures of the Tamil country and those of other parts of India. The division of Tamil society is 
seen perhaps most prominently in the valleys, of the Kaveri in (the old, undivided) Thanjavur 
District, and in that of the Tamirapani in the south. Here there were, and to an extent still are, 
distinct settlements occupied by each of the three groups, but all within the boundaries of a 
single ‘village’. Caste people lived in the ur, though the Brahmins usually occupied a separate 
and often a detached street. The Dalits occupied the ceri [‘cheri’], a physically distinct settlement 
not considered to be part of the ur. At the very least there were well distinguished quarters or 
                                                          
8 A term widely used for Dalits in the colonial period. 
9 Thanks to Rupa Viswanath for this reference. 
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streets occupied exclusively by the three groups. Elsewhere in Tamil Nadu, where Brahmins are 
few in number, there are no agraharams (the distinct settlements or streets of Brahmins), but it is 
usually the case that the Dalits are confined to their own hamlets, effectively segregated ghettoes 
(the ‘cheris’, sometimes referred to as ‘colonies’10). 
Big changes have come about in Tamil society as a result of urbanization, colonial 
‘modernisation’ and industrialization. It was in the context of 19th century urbanization that very 
important changes took place in the character of caste. Ideas of caste ‘substance’ based on 
common features of culture facilitated the development of more extended networks that were of 
advantage to upwardly mobile groups. Whereas marriages had been regulated by rules of 
kinship, some caste communities took deliberate decisions that permitted the formation of much 
more distant alliances than would have been possible before (Barnett 1975). Tamil Nadu is now 
the most highly urbanized of India’s major states (48.4 per cent of the population was urban in 
2011 – by 2015 almost certainly over 50 per cent), and it is generally considered to be the best-
connected too, with metalled roads reaching into many villages and frequent bus services. This, 
recently, has greatly facilitated movements of labour out of agriculture through commuting and 
short and long term migration. One recent estimate is that there are as many as 7.2 million 
‘commuting workers’ in contemporary Tamil Nadu.11 Perhaps most important, formerly 
dominant landholding caste groups have tended to move out of agriculture and of the villages. 
This is most strikingly the case of the erstwhile Brahmin landlords of Thanjavur and the 
Tamirapani river valley (Fuller and Narasimhan 2014; Harriss et al. 2012), but it is happening 
with others as well – for example with Reddiar landlords in the region of Villupuram District 
(Harriss et al. 2010) and in the case of Mudaliars in villages in northern Tamil Nadu 
(Arrivukkarasi and Nagaraj 2009).Village studies from different parts of the state show, indeed, 
the near disappearance of the so-called Forward Castes from the villages (Harriss and Jeyaranjan 
2015), and historically lower ranking jatis, like the Vanniyars around Villupuram, or Yadhavs 
further north, have been taking over lands that were formerly owned by Reddiars and 
                                                          
10 This term seems to have come into use in the context of ‘Harijan’ welfare programmes only from the 1960s – 
though it was certainly in common use locally by the early 1970s (Rupa Viswanath, in a personal communication). 
11 This estimate is given by S. Anandhi and M. Vijayabaskar, ‘Where buying a motorcycle can spark a riot’, The 
Hindu January 7, 2013. 
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Agamudaiyan Mudaliars. These studies also show that rural caste structures have often been 
simplified, as it is commonly the case that many of the artisanal and specialist service castes 
have moved out of the villages. There is, for example, no longer the demand that there was for 
the services of blacksmiths and carpenters in the manufacturing of ploughs and carts. Clay pots 
have been replaced in daily use – though not in some rituals – by plastic and aluminium vessels. 
Hereditary potters have moved into other occupations. Blacksmiths and carpenters ply their 
trades rather in the towns. Meanwhile, agricultural labour, the village studies show, has become 
more than ever the occupation of Dalits12 – Paraiyars in the north of the state, Pallars (who claim 
Kshatriya status as Devendra Kullatars) in the south, and Aruntathiars (also known as Matharis 
or Chakkiliyars) in the west. Though the relationships amongst different caste groups described 
by anthropologists as the ‘jajmani system’ were still observed in Tamil Nadu in the 1970s there 
is little evidence of them having persisted into the 21st century.13 
Caste structures and relations in Tamil Nadu have, therefore, been highly localized. 
Washbrook describes relations both of caste and of class in Tamil society as having been marked 
historically by ‘diffuseness and fragmentation’ (1989: 225). He describes the latter – class 
relations – as being characterized by ‘almost infinite petit bourgeoisification’ (1989: 220). He 
refers here to the continuing processes of fragmentation of agricultural land holdings and of the 
reproduction of small production units – the development of Tamil agriculture under capitalism 
has not led to the consolidation of landholdings by capitalist farmers14 – and, as he says, ‘as in 
the countryside so in the towns (where) much “labour” possessed small property’. There has 
been, in the towns, a ‘proliferation of a petit bourgeoisie based in pedlar commerce, quasi-
artisanal and small workshop production and educated professional employment’ (1989: 220-
21). This describes fairly well, in broad outline, the economic organization of the towns. This has 
                                                          
12 Or, it may be, that agricultural labour has become once again the occupation of Dalits. In the 19 th century most 
agricultural work was done by Dalits under conditions of slavery (see Viswanath 2014). It seems possible that 
members of other caste groups only began to engage in agricultural labour later in the 19th and in the 20th centuries.  
13 For a critical treatment of the idea of ‘the jajmani system’ see Fuller 1989. A description of relationships between 
castes corresponding with what has been called the jajmani system from the early 1970s is found in Harriss 1982, 
chapter 6. For commentary on the effective disappearance of these relationships see Harriss et al. 2010, 2012. See 
also Guha 2013, chapter 3. 
14 On these processes and the trends in landholding and the organization of agriculture see Harriss 1982, Chapter 8; 
and Harriss and Jeyaranjan 2015. 
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been analysed in great detail with regard to the market town of Arni in northern Tamil Nadu by 
Barbara Harriss-White, who draws on observations made over three decades and shows the still 
intimate connections between caste and class differences in this ‘petit bourgeoisified’ economy. 
‘In Arni’s fast expanding urban economy’, Harriss-White shows, ‘caste still supplies a 
broadly hierarchical social order’ (2003: 197, emphasis in the original). She reports that ‘Control 
of business by members of Forward Castes [here Jains, Marwaris, Veera Saiva Chettiars and 
others, who make up about 12 per cent of the population of the town] is stable in absolute terms’ 
(2003: 182). Those officially defined as ‘Backward Castes’ – in Arni the most numerous of them 
are Agamudaiyan Mudaliars, historically also the dominant agricultural caste in the region – 
make up about a third of the population and have been becoming more significant as business-
owners. Members of the ‘Most Backward Castes’ – by far the most numerous of them being 
Vanniyars – who make up another third or so of the population, and the Scheduled Castes (15 per 
cent of the population), together make up around 80 per cent of the casual labour force. A range 
of ‘low-tech, physically dirty and (still, for some) ritually polluting work’, which is nonetheless 
essential for the running of the town and the functioning of the economy is pretty much the 
‘preserve’ of the SCs (2003: 182). They are, on the other hand, still denied access to some other 
jobs. A battle to enable them to enter silk-weaving – a major industry of the town – was going 
on, for example, even towards the turn of the century. In short, castes, Harriss-White argues, 
show little sign of erosion, though the institution of caste is being reworked into a form of 
corporatist regulation of the capitalist economy. Caste membership affords trust and provides 
social networks on which a great deal of the economic activity of the town depends. Quite 
contrary to the expectations of many scholars who have thought that economic liberalization and 
modernization would dissolve economic relations based on caste, Harriss-White finds that caste-
based relationships have become more important, revealing ‘a deeply segmented social structure 
in which caste is ultimately connected with all the other organisations of civil society that 
comprehensively regulate economic and social life’ (2003: 178). There is, therefore, an 
economic basis for the reproduction of caste differences, and they are still organized 
hierarchically – even if this hierarchy reflects a long history of economic differentiation rather 
than the structural opposition of purity and pollution. 
 Simons Papers in Security and Development No. 44/2015      12 
 
Caste competition for middle class and formal sector jobs persists, as well, in Chennai 
and other larger cities. There is strong evidence that the kind of cultural capital commanded by 
Tamil Brahmins and by some others from amongst the ‘Forward Castes’ of the state, can give 
them a significant advantage in gaining access to the most sought-after jobs, such as those in the 
IT sector. Fuller and Narasimhan have studied the relative success of the Brahmins, describing 
them as a ‘middle class caste’ that is especially well represented amongst those employed in the 
best jobs. As they say ‘In the long run the caste’s traditional “vocational ethic” of learning and 
education has clearly been a flexible asset in enabling and encouraging Brahmins, who once 
belonged to a landed elite, to diversify into a range of occupations in a modern economy’ (2014: 
228). Such occupations include ownership of a majority of Tamil Nadu’s biggest businesses 
(Harriss 2003), and seem amply to compensate for the relative exclusion of Brahmins from 
public sector employment that resulted from political non-Brahminism.  
Caste distinctions influence even civil society and the world of NGOs. In Chennai there 
is a sharp distinction between Brahmin-dominated networks of civil society associations in the 
southern part of the city, and a mainly Christian-led network in the north: ‘Those in the North 
Chennai network talk explicitly of the ‘caste-base’ of civil society activism in the city, and there 
remains a good deal of resentment towards what is seen as Brahminical paternalism …’ (Harriss 
2011: 100). Caste relations have changed considerably, no doubt, but there are significant ways 
in which caste hierarchy persists. 
The Politics of Identity in the Non-Brahmin and Dravidian Movements  
As M. S. S. Pandian writes in his study Brahmin and Non-Brahmin, these identities, 
which have come to ‘possess a normal presence in the region’, ‘were mutually constituted in the 
Tamil region during the colonial period’ and make sense ‘only within a framework of mutual 
opposition and antagonism’ (2007: 4, 6). The idea of a common Non-Brahmin identity, and 
subsequently ideas of ‘Dravidianness’ or ‘Tamilness’, have their origins in the economic and 
social changes of the later 19th century, and in the urbanization of Tamil society. In this context 
Brahmins retained their high status and were culturally separated from the ‘forward’ non-
Brahmins who had enjoyed considerable privilege and prestige in local rural society, but were 
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now reduced to a common Shudra status, perceived as being inferior to that of the Brahmins. 
These were the circumstances of the formation – with some encouragement from the British, 
intent on countering the anti-colonial movement for Home Rule (Irschick 1969) – of what 
became known as the Non-Brahmin Movement, opposed to Brahmin dominance in the 
bureaucracy and the professions.15 This, by a process of association, developed into a political 
movement first around the idea of the Dravidian (Brahmins being held not to be ‘Dravidian’), 
and then the idea of the ‘Tamilian’ (as Bishop Caldwell had explained). Marguerite Barnett 
argues in her classic account of the history of Dravidian politics that the increasing political, 
social and cultural isolation of the Brahmins: 
…became significant (that is, necessitated action) as increasing urbanization and mobility 
challenged forward non-Brahmin status, rendered the symbol ‘Suddra’ (sic) exceptionally 
meaningful, and led to the development of a sense of relative deprivation. Politically, 
Home Rule was identified with Brahmin rule. The first Justice Party [the South Indian 
Liberal Federation, founded in 1916, the party of non-Brahminism] demands were, 
therefore, political and administrative, attempting to counteract Brahmin dominance in 
these areas. However, Justice party ideology and demands did not long remain so limited. 
Elite Suddras focused their ire on Brahmins and, utilising the research on Dravidians by 
European scholars, began elaborating a counter-cultural tradition. (Barnett 1976: 26) 
 
Non-Brahmins are ‘Dravidians’, Brahmins are not.  
A more developed ideology countering the Brahminical Hindu tradition then came to be 
elaborated with the formation of the Self-Respect Association in 1925, under the leadership of 
Periyar, who had broken with Congress over the separation of Brahmins and Non-Brahmins in a 
school set up by the party. According to Geetha and Rajadurai, the establishment of the Self-
Respect Association was a deliberate counter to Gandhi. The two authors explain that: 
The Self-Respecters’ desire to found a community of rational, fraternal, freedom-loving 
citizens … was propelled forward by their conviction in the principle of what they termed 
samadharma … (which) … assumed equality amongst men and between men and women 
but, more important … required that this equality be realized in and through an 
affirmation of each individual’s self-respect (Geetha and Rajadurai 1998: 384) 
 
Consistent with this overarching principle was the centrality accorded by Periyar to the 
abolition of caste. Two years before his death, on his 93rd birthday, he observed “I have 
                                                          
15 But see Washbrook’s critical discussion of the claims of the Non-Brahmin elites (1989: 212).  
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endeavoured all along to abolish caste … (which) … has meant that I carry out propaganda for 
the abolition of God, Religion, the Shastras and Brahmins. For caste will disappear only when 
these four disappear … One cannot abolish caste without instilling a taste for freedom and 
knowledge [in the people]’ (cited by Geetha and Rajadurai 1998: 350). But though Periyar 
himself was a consistent critic of untouchability, though his journal Kudi Arasu carried reports of 
events and actions that concerned Adi-Dravidas, and though the Self-Respecters, for instance, 
protested against the Poona Pact, scholars still maintain that Periyar tended to identify the 
‘Dravidian’ with the Shudra. And according to Barnett again, ‘social support for the Self-Respect 
Movement is difficult to gauge’. But she goes on to say that ‘The early movements were 
certainly supported largely by forward caste Hindus’, and that only ‘As the movement developed 
into the 1940s (did) larger and larger numbers of backward castes become involved’ (1976: 50-
51).  
It is important to remember the very clear demarcation in Tamil society between those 
now generally called Dalit, and others. Rupa Viswanath tells us that in the 19th century the caste 
names of the Dalits (whether Paraiyar, Pallar or Chakkiliyar – all of whom came to be known to 
the British as ‘Pariahs’) were used by Indians interchangeably with words meaning ‘slave’, and 
that the conditions of their lives and labour, especially in the most fertile rice-growing regions, 
were indeed commonly described by foreign visitors as slavery (2014: 3). And not only was ‘the 
social hiatus between Pariah labourers and all others … rigorously policed (and) inscribed into 
the geography of the village itself’ (in the way described earlier) but it was marked out even in 
language, for ‘in the nineteenth century, the term … “Tamilian” referred exclusively to caste 
Tamils. One could be a Tamil or a Pariah – but not both’ (Viswanath 2014: 31). The term 
‘paraiya’ was also widely understood as an insult. And according to Washbrook’s interpretation 
of the rich historical literature on medieval and early modern Tamil society, it was a society 
characterized by intense competition for privilege or honours – from which, however, Dalits 
were always excluded. As he says ‘Untouchability has always supplied the ultimate defining line 
of both “unprivilege” and identity in historical Tamil society’ (1989: 239). This is an idea to 
which we will return. 
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It was only after the formation, under Periyar’s leadership, of the Dravida Kazhagam in 
1944, following the coming together (in 1938) of the Self-Respect League and the old Justice 
Party, that larger numbers of backward castes began to be drawn in. This process was taken 
further following the creation of the political party, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), 
led by C. N. Annadurai, in 1949. The split between Annadurai and Periyar came about largely – 
it seems – because the former had come to think that the way forward was through electoral 
politics, in which case it was important to build support amongst the numerous backward castes 
of Madras, whereas Periyar continued to eschew electoral politics. Barnett concludes her 
discussion of this period as follows: 
Mass mobilization of the backward castes during the 1940s transformed the character of 
the Madras Presidency political arena and determined the essential constraints on radical 
politics. The orientation of the backward castes was toward maintaining their position in 
the face of competition from Untouchables and other backward groups. This status was 
not threatened by the wealthy landlord and the proud and orthodox Brahmin, but by the 
previously subservient Untouchable (1976: 83, emphasis added) 
 
Brahmins and elite or ‘forward’ non-Brahmins had begun increasingly to support the 
Congress in the 1930s, and – Barnett argues – the social and economic dependence upon them of 
so many of the Dalit agricultural workers of the state meant that in rural areas their vote, too, 
went to Congress. For the DMK, ‘That left the backward castes as the best potential base of 
support’ (1976: 99). Yet this meant the dilution of the radical agenda of social reform that the 
DMK had taken over from the DK and the longer tradition of the Self-Respect Movement: 
‘Backward castes in Madras accepted social reform as a relevant social goal, but social reform 
did not have the radical connotations of Dravidian ideology, that is atheism or anti-Hinduism. 
Social reform, as it came to be defined in the 1950s, meant uplift of the scheduled and backward 
castes’ (1976: 99). And given that the scheduled castes had by now become eligible for positive 
discrimination – thanks to measures first introduced by the British and then extended by the post-
independence Indian state, the backward castes of Madras felt themselves to be relatively 
neglected (even though reservations as quotas for different groups had first been introduced after 
the Justice Party was elected to office in 1920). 
(T)he DMK began to talk more about this ‘neglected’ segment, ‘neither the very bottom 
nor the very top of society’. It was this ‘common man’ that Annadurai claimed to 
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represent. The appeal to the common man was directed toward the rising urban middle 
class, the educated unemployed youth, and the middling (film-going) farmer in the 
backward castes … the political arena in Madras state was inhospitable to radical social 
reform as the basis for a mass political organization seeking election victories (Barnett 
1976: 100) 
 
The resonance with the 19th century distinction between the ‘Tamilian’ and the ‘Pariah’ is 
unmistakable. The DMK proceeded to build and to maintain a strong base mainly amongst the 
‘common man’ who was neither ‘the very top nor the very bottom of society’. The party still 
spoke of ‘social reform’, but the term came to mean ‘the uplift of the backward classes’. ‘The 
movement’s early emphasis on untouchability, the destruction of caste and on women’s 
emancipation’, say Geetha and Rajadurai, ‘was abandoned gradually, and even cast out of the 
collective memory’ (2002: 121).16 At the same time, ‘Amidst an electorate which is 
predominantly composed of believers’, recognizing that ‘atheism may not be workable plank’, 
the DMK aligned itself ‘with the pre-existing Tamil common sense’ and courted certain forms of 
religiosity (Pandian 2012: 64). In recent years the leaders of the two major Dravidian parties 
have competed between each other over who has done most for temples and temple priests 
(Harriss 2002).  
The DMK won office in 1967, drawing primarily on the support of the backward classes, 
and maintained itself in office through the pursuit of what Narendra Subramanian (1999) refers 
to as ‘assertive populism’, under which excluded groups are urged to assert themselves against 
the discrimination they have faced and to secure entitlements – to education, to jobs, loans, 
subsidized consumer goods and sometimes small pieces of property. Later, after the formation of 
the Anna DMK, following the breakaway by M. G. Ramachandran (‘MGR’) and his followers in 
1972, the politics of Tamil Nadu came to be dominated rather by what Subramanian calls 
‘paternalist populism’, under which a benevolent leader – a type of whom MGR was the 
                                                          
16 As Nate Roberts has pointed out to me (personal communication 29 April 2015), it is, to say the least, 
questionable as to whether the Dravidian movement was ever truly ‘radical’. It eschewed communist leaders, and 
Dravidianists, including Periyar, never looked closely at the political-economic basis of caste. To have done so 
would have undermined their own leaders, and funders, who came from landed and merchant backgrounds. There is 
a sense in which the Brahmin/Non-Brahmin distinction functions as an ideological dodge, diverting attention away 
from class contradictions, and away from the combined social and class antagonism between Dalits and all the 
others. 
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archetype – or party promises to provide for ‘the people’ through subsidised wage goods and 
protection from repressive elites. 
The pursuit of these populist politics and policies, according to their (initially, at least) 
somewhat different modes, by the two Dravidian parties, has proven enormously successful 
electorally – and has given rise to some real achievements in regard to social development.17 The 
Tamil scholar and political commentator M. S. S. Pandian argued, too, that ‘The [Dravidian] 
movement’s most singular achievement, which even its worst critics cannot fail to acknowledge, 
is to have infused the much-needed sense of self-respect among the non-Brahmins” (1994: 221). 
But the two parties long ago left behind the social reforming objectives of the Dravidian 
movement. In the 1990s scholars such as Pandian and Anandhi S. spoke of the ‘ideological 
retrogression’ of the two parties and of the failure of the DMK in particular to carry out any sort 
of an offensive against casteism (discussed in Harriss 2002). The broad ‘Non-Brahmin’ identity 
was broken apart, Pandian argued, because different non-Brahmin caste groups experienced very 
different trajectories of development. Chettiars,18 Gounders, Kallars, Nadars and Naidus came to 
make up an important fraction of the social and political elite of the state, while others such, 
notably, as the numerous Vanniyars, and the Dalits failed to keep pace. ‘It became difficult’, he 
says, ‘to hold together the pre-existing ‘consensual’ bloc’. He notes that ‘The materially most 
advanced sections of the non-Brahmins such as the Chettiar elite, who during their economic 
ascendancy endorsed and funded the movement, found it no longer to be of any great relevance’. 
And if the economic success of some caste groups led them to drift away from the movement, 
some others did much the same, but for opposite reasons. ‘The Adi-Dravidas, Vanniyars and 
others found the movement to be woefully falling short of their expectations, the proof of which, 
for them, was their own continuing underdeveloped status’. Beyond this ‘the growing power and 
the caste arrogance of the backward caste elites at the local level … often translated itself into 
anti-Adi Dravida violence’ (quotes from Pandian 1994: 221). 
                                                          
17 Rina Agarwala’s analysis (2013) of the competition between the two parties, in order to win the votes of informal 
sector workers, provides a very good explanation of how competitive populism can deliver social benefits. 
18 This is the remarkable caste cluster in which, historically, caste institutions formed the framework for extensive 
and powerful banking operations, as Rudner (1998) has explained in an important study. 
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The disaffection of Dalits was eventually reflected in the establishment of Dalit political 
parties. The first of these was the Puthiya Tamilagam (PT), born in 1996 of the Devendra Kula 
Vellala Federation which calls for Pallars in the south of the state to be recognized as Devendra 
Kula Vellalars, and provided with special benefits; and then, formed in 1999, the Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK), which mobilises mainly Paraiyars in northern Tamil Nadu, and also 
emerged from a social movement, the Dalit Panthers. The divisions amongst the Dalits are 
further reflected in the existence of several political organisations amongst the Aruntathiars – 
referred to in the Governor’s Address in Tamil Nadu in 2008 as ‘the untouchables among the 
untouchables’. These organisations did however come together in pressing the demand for 
special reservations for their community, which was finally recognized in the passage of the 
Tamil Nadu Aruntathiyar Special Reservation Act in 2009 – though it continues to be contested 
by non-Aruntathiar Scheduled Castes in the state (Pandian 2013b19). 
Somewhat earlier, in the 1980s, a successful agitation by Vanniyars in the northern 
districts for a separate 20 per cent quota led to the formation in 1989 of the Pattali Makkal Katchi 
(PMK), a Vanniyar party led by S. Ramadoss. There has long been conflict across northern 
Tamil Nadu between Paraiyars and Vanniyars, which erupted into an especially notable instance 
of violence in Villupuram, in 1978 (and see Harriss et al. 2010 on the history of the relations of 
Vanniyars and Paraiyars in a village outside Villupuram). Ramadoss briefly interrupted 
‘orchestrated violence against the Dalits’, in 2003, when for electoral reasons he formed an 
alliance with the VCK (built around the idea of a Tamil Protection Movement). But when this 
failed to work he turned the PMK back to the strategy of trying to bring together intermediate 
castes against Dalits (Pandian 2013a). Meanwhile, in the western part of the state there is conflict 
between Kongu Vellalar Gounders and Aruntathiars; and in the south between Pallars and 
Thevars (a caste cluster which brings together the distinct clans of Kallars, Maravars of 
Agamudiyars: see Manikumar 1997). The incidence of discrimination against Dalits shows no 
signs of diminishing, and both the major Dravidian parties, when in government, have turned a 
blind eye to violence – including that of the police – when it has suited them. 
                                                          
19 Pandian notes in this article that ‘the category dalit, instead of unifying oppressed communities, has become the 
nomenclature for the Paraiyars in the state’ according to some members of other Dalit castes (2013b: 20). 
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Pandian remarks that ‘the old historic block of non-brahmins or Tamils, which subsumed 
and muted various sectional interests, has developed irreparable fissures’ (2006: 2182). And 
Andre Beteille was prescient when he remarked, almost 40 years earlier, that ‘Perhaps the most 
important consequence of the Non-Brahmin Movement was the introduction of a ‘communal’ or 
caste idiom into South Indian politics’ (1991 [1969]: 90). Rationalist, avowedly secular, and 
ostensibly committed against caste and religion though it was, the Self-Respect Movement took 
on mobilization around the Non-Brahmin identity, and the subsequent politics of the Dravidian 
movement came to play upon the distinction between backward castes and Dalits. Communities 
were defined by their symbolic privileges and traditional social disadvantages vis-à-vis 
Brahmins, and mobilisation on class lines was occluded. In recording the history of agrarian 
conflict in Tirunelveli, for instance, K. A. Manikumar notes with regret that ‘the political parties 
failed to politicize the Dalits and organize them on class lines as happened in Kerala’ (1997: 
2243).20 Now, in the context of the economic and social changes of the present, the particular 
relations between different OBCs and the Dalits, in different parts of the state, have given rise to 
caste-based movements and to the birth of a significant number of caste-based parties. And 
though these have not been at all successful electorally (Pandian 2013a), ‘caste feeling’ runs 
high, all the same. 
Privilege/Honour under Threat  
The story of caste relations in Tamil Nadu over the last twenty five years or so of the 20th 
century and the early years of the 21st is reflected in the title of an article by S. Anandhi and M. 
Vijayabaskar from 2013: ‘Where buying a motorcycle can spark a riot’21. Their article was 
occasioned by an ugly event in the Dharmapuri district of Tamil Nadu, when 300 or so Dalit 
houses and a lot of their property were destroyed by rampaging Vanniyars, angered by the 
marriage of a Vanniyar woman to a Dalit youth, and the subsequent suicide of the girl’s father. 
But, say the authors, the underlying reason was ‘the simmering discontent against the upward 
                                                          
20 In Kerala the left movement had its roots in caste-based social reform movements, but succeeded in transcending 
them. The Kerala case is discussed in Harriss and Törnquist (2015). It should be noted that Tamil communists did 
succeed in mobilising Dalits, in Thanjavur especially,in the 1950s and 1960s (Bouton 1985). 
21 See note 11. 
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mobility of Dalits’. They continue: ‘The growing intolerance of the intermediate castes towards 
this economic mobility of the Dalits is not confined to Dharmapuri district alone. In the last two 
decades, eleven districts in the State have witnessed similar destruction of Dalit property as part 
of caste violence’. During the attacks in Dharmapuri, according to a report on the events, the 
Vanniyar assailants kept chanting that they were punishing the Dalits for ‘the “offence” of 
“untouchables” acquiring wealth and cattle, having a tiled roof, educating their children, and 
acquiring gold ornaments’ (Senthalir 2012: 13). The ‘offence’ of having a tiled roof echoes 
events of the 19th century, when Dalits were prohibited from constructing tiled (=flame resistant) 
homes – arson being amongst the techniques of caste domination (Roberts 2010, note 35). Not 
only houses, however, but according to government figures, at least 50 ‘two-wheelers’ were 
destroyed. Anandhi and Vijayabaskar point to the particular significance of this. There is of 
course an intimate link between caste honour and control over women’s sexuality, and 
consequently great fear on the part of men from the dominant castes of Dalits luring away ‘their 
women’. The motorbike is a symbol of masculinity, and dominant caste men who are fearful of 
the erosion of their masculine power reassert it symbolically through the destruction of the 
Dalits’ bikes. 
The context of this ‘simmering discontent’ amongst caste groups such as the Vanniyars, 
the Thevars and the Kongu Vellalar Gounders is that of the declining importance of agriculture 
in Tamil Nadu (it accounts for only about eight per cent of state domestic product, and has been 
largely stagnant since the hey-day of the green revolution in the 1970s and 1980s), and its impact 
on socio-economic relations in the villages. These changes are negotiated, Anandhi and 
Vijayabaskar argue, ‘through altered caste and gender relations posing challenges to the 
intermediates castes’ pre-existing power’. The move of Dalits from agricultural labour into 
manufacturing and service occupations in the country towns – even though it is more constrained 
than that of labourers from higher castes, as Harriss-White shows in the study of Arni, cited 
earlier, and as is shown in village studies (Harriss and Jeyaranjan 2015) – has reduced the ability 
of the intermediate castes to control Dalit youth. The effects of tightening labour markets are 
supplemented by the impact of state sponsored welfare interventions which have become much 
more extensive over the last decade, with the introduction of MGNREGA and in Tamil Nadu the 
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availability of free rice through the Public Distribution System. De Neve and Carswell report 
from studies in western Tamil Nadu that these developments have heightened tensions between 
landowners and labourers, while Gounder industrialists believe that they have reduced labour 
supply in their factories and workshops. So, these authors say, ‘The anger and frustration among 
the dominant Backward Classes about populist and pro-poor development policies have 
engendered a new electoral politics that plays on the combined identities of caste and region’ 
(2011: 209). Here they refer to the formation of a new political party in the western region of 
Kongu Nadu which has an anti-Dalit agenda even whilst making regional claims.  
These points are amplified by Vijayabaskar and Wyatt (2013) in their study of recent 
developments in this region of the state, dominated by Kongu Vellalar Gounders. The party that 
De Neve and Carswell refer to, the Kongu Nadu Munnetra Kazhagam (KNMK), establish in 
2009 to contest the Lok Sabha election of that year, has its origins in the Kongu Vellalar 
Goundergal Peravai, a caste welfare association that was itself formed in 1988. The party is led 
by Gounders and stands for Gounder interests, while claiming to articulate concerns that affect 
the region as a whole, notably of power supply and infrastructure development, with the aim – so 
far largely unrealized – of attracting other voters. The Gounders have a particularly strong self-
image of themselves as set apart from others. They are the ‘lords of the soil’ – reckoned to make 
up about 30 per cent of the population of the western region of Kongu Nadu, and to have owned 
as much as 80 per cent of the land of the old Coimbatore District. They value self-employment as 
bringing ‘independence’. They have a culture of ‘toil’, of hard work, and credit much of their 
recent success in textile manufacturing to their willingness themselves to engage in physical 
work alongside their employees (Chari 2004). They have not, until the last two decades or so, 
had all that much interest in education. But this is a culture that has come under stress as a result 
of economic changes. One important expression of this that appeared in the early years of this 
century is the increasing difficulty that even prosperous Gounder farmers have experienced in 
finding brides for their sons, if they are not well-educated and with prospects outside agriculture. 
Some have resorted to taking brides from outside the community, often from Kerala.22 
                                                          
22 Personal communications from Sharada Srinivasan (University of Guelph). 
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The Gounder community is economically differentiated, and some are labourers, like 
very many of the Dalits of their villages. Most propertied Gounders continue to value their 
relationship with the land and with agriculture – in spite of the problems of the agricultural 
economy of a dry belt, dependent upon groundwater irrigation – but some have become 
successful businessmen, as owners of power looms in villages and towns, while others are 
owners of small and medium businesses in the hosiery manufacturing centre of Tiruppur. A few 
of these wealthier men have invested time and resources into KNMK, looking mainly for 
stronger representation of their community in the politics of the state. Most important of all, 
however, the party builds Gounder resistance against the mobilisations of the lower castes – 
notably against the several organisations representing Aruntathiars – and seeks to reassert 
Gounder caste privilege and control over labour. Vijayabaskar and Wyatt say that ‘Many in 
Tamil Nadu [including some of their respondents] take seriously the social reform agenda of the 
Dravidian movement which called into question caste privileges’ (2013: 109). But the idea of 
community representation, in defence of those privileges, while contested by some, remains a 
powerful one. 
The tightening of labour markets and enhanced welfare provisioning by the state have led 
to increasing challenges to Gounder privilege and domination. A particular aspect of these 
tensions is the use by Dalits of national legislation directed against caste crimes, the 1989 
Prevention of Atrocities Act. An important example is that when Gounder employers try to 
recover advances that they have paid, or claim to have paid to Dalit workers, the workers may 
‘lodge a complaint that they have been abused using derogatory caste names’. These actions 
have built up Gounder anger against the Dalits who are seen to have gained ‘unfair protection’, 
and ‘The KNMK has become involved so that whenever a complaint has been lodged or a Dalit 
attempts to lodge a complaint, KNMK cadres try to prevent the booking of Gounders under (the) 
Act (often successfully)’ (Vijayabaskar and Wyatt 2013: 109). On the other hand Carswell and 
De Neve have argued that ‘though the litigation route further antagonizes caste relations … the 
Act has provided Dalits with an invaluable tool to seek justice, democratize public space, and 
challenge the power of the dominant caste in the region’ (2015, Abstract). 
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The KNMK does also campaign for the inclusion of the Kongu Vellalar Gounder 
community in the list of ‘Most Backward Classes’, so as to be able to claim the special benefits 
for those so classified. Vijayabaskar and Wyatt argue, however, that the mobilization of the party 
– contrary to some understandings – is not primarily about reservations but rather is a ‘response 
to conflict within society and to economic issues that challenge the status of the Gounders’ 
(2013: 110). The argument is a convincing one. 
There is an irony about the tensions between Gounders and Aruntathiars in western Tamil 
Nadu because, as the Governor of the State said some years ago, they are the ‘untouchables of 
the untouchables’. Recent village studies provide a lot of evidence on the extent of labour market 
segmentation on caste lines, and the disabilities especially of Dalits. As Isabelle Guerin and her 
co-authors, in a study of villages in Villupuram and Cuddalore districts say, ‘old hierarchies 
persist in the midst of the changes that India has undergone over the past decades’ – though as 
Grace Carswell concludes ‘It is not simply that Dalits are excluded from urban jobs. Rather, 
some Dalits, from some villages, have less access to urban jobs than others … labour market 
segmentation works differently in localities just a few miles apart’ (2013: 335). Carswell found 
that, in the two villages she studied outside Tiruppur, the Aruntathiars (here known as Matharis) 
were still much more heavily dependent upon agricultural wage work than the Adi-Dravidas, 
who have done very much better in securing wage work outside agriculture. The point is also 
emphasized in her research from the same area of western Tamil Nadu by Judith Heyer (2010, 
2014). 
In the village in northern Tamil Nadu studied by Anandhi (2013), it is Telugu-speaking 
Naidus whose dominance is contested. Here – exceptionally – the Paraiyars are now treated as 
equal to the middle castes in the village, with whom they compare well in terms of their living 
standards. Their mobility beyond the village, taking up non-agricultural jobs, and their access to 
state-provided welfare, has given them the resources to resist their marginalization in the village, 
and they refuse caste-based employment or domestic and menial work. The Aruntathiars in the 
same village, meanwhile, lacking comparable access to education and employment, are still 
heavily dependent upon the Naidu landowners. They continue to participate in ritual practices in 
which some of their girls and women are dedicated to the goddess Mathamma that have the 
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effect of sustaining the caste hierarchy of the village, and pretty certainly condemn them to being 
exploited sexually by higher caste men. There are now contestations between Naidus, 
Aruntathiar men, and NGOs that are trying to stop the ritual practices, involving control over 
Aruntathiar women. 
Conclusion 
Washbrook’s argument, to which I referred earlier, that the society of the Tamil country 
in the medieval and early modern eras was characterized by intense competition for privilege or 
honours seems insightful. As is the further point that ‘Untouchability has always supplied the 
ultimate defining line of both “unprivilege” and identity in historical Tamil society’ (1989: 239). 
There is truth, no doubt, in the assertions of scholars such as James Manor (2010) that hierarchy 
and dominance have generally declined in rural society in India, but – as I have shown in this 
essay – tension and contestation over caste privilege remain extremely significant, certainly in 
Tamil society. Rupa Viswanath’s careful historical analysis of ‘the Pariah problem’ in the 19th 
and early 20th centuries clearly shows how very sharp the break was between Dalits and the rest 
of the society, a break marked, as she points out, in language. Linguistically, ‘Tamilians’ were 
not Pariahs/Dalits, and Dalits/Pariahs could not be Tamilians. In the middle of the last century, 
the Self Respect Movement and then the Dravidian Movement, inspired by the social radicalism 
of Periyar, opposed caste privilege. But once Annadurai had created a political party, the DMK, 
with the objective of securing power in the state, the compulsions of politics meant that, as Nate 
Roberts has put it well, ‘from the 1960s onwards, the Dravidian parties unabashedly courted the 
powerful and populous BC castes, who were at once Dalits’ most immediate oppressors and the 
foundation of the Dravidian parties’ social and political dominance over rural Tamil Nadu’ 
(2010, para 12). Social reform came to be identified with the ‘uplift’ of the backward castes, who 
were represented as not having benefited to the same extent as had the Scheduled Castes from 
affirmative action on the part of the state.23 The social radicalism of the Dravidian Movement – 
                                                          
23 Though, as Christopher Fuller has pointed out to me, it is ironic that by this time the backward castes had largely 
displaced the Brahmins in government and public sector jobs and education – as had been the original aim of the 
Non-Brahmin Movement. 
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such as it was, given its neglect of political economy – was gradually lost. And, as Pandian 
argued, over time the encompassing ‘Non-Brahmin’ identity developed ‘irreparable fissures’, 
given the increasing differentiation amongst the non-Brahmin caste clusters. Then, as Senthalir 
argues in his observation on the caste violence in Dharmapuri of 2012: 
Job opportunities available in the cities and the assertion of dalits to take up non-
traditional jobs have disrupted established caste relations, taking away privileges that 
caste Hindus enjoyed over centuries. On the other hand, women equipped with education 
and employment resist patriarchal caste values and now independently exercise their 
choice in selecting their life partners. This has infuriated caste Hindus who are becoming 
increasingly intolerant of the upward economic mobility of dalits and empowerment of 
women (2012: 13) 
 
It is often the case that those who in reality are relatively unprivileged, and whose 
material circumstances are precarious, are most tenacious in the defence of their status and of 
what privilege they have. As Karthikeyan, Rajangam and Gorringe have argued, ‘most anti-dalit 
violence in the state is perpetrated by the intermediate castes and occurs to demonstrate that they 
are higher status than their victims’ (2012: 33). They also point out that ‘A paradoxical outcome 
of dalit mobilization has been the way in which the dominant castes have recently embraced 
victimisation and portrayed themselves as at the receiving end of reverse casteism’24 (2012: 32). 
Some dominant castes have formed themselves into defensive fronts under such banners as the 
Thevar Protection Front or the Non-Dalit Common People’s Association – in spite of the 
abundant evidence of the lack of power and influence of the Dalit parties or of ordinary Dalits, 
while at the same time, as these authors say, ‘Caste majoritarianism is writ large in the 
prominence accorded to members of the [dominant] castes in all government posts from police 
through panchayat leaders to ministerial berths’ (2012: 30). Another reflection of the 
defensiveness of dominant castes is in the actions of Kongu Vellalar Gounders – encouraged by 
the RSS – against the writer, Perumal Murugan. 
So it is that, as the Economic and Political Weekly editorialized in 2012 ‘The oppression, 
social humiliation and exploitation of the dalit and tribal communities in Tamil Nadu contradict 
                                                          
24 Nate Roberts points out (personal communication) that in his Srinivas Memorial Lecture in 2000, the late Gerald 
Berreman discussed anti-affirmative action rhetoric in the United States as one in which whites have adopted a 
victim role 
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the accepted image of the state as having made impressive social and economic advances over 
the years’ (2012: 9). In the face of this continuing subjection the Dalit parties are constrained by 
the fact that even in alliance – and, of course, perhaps the most crucial problem they confront is 
that of the divisions amongst themselves – they lack the numbers to stand much chance of 
winning office. They have sought, therefore, to bring in the votes of people from other 
communities, latterly by diluting their anti-caste radicalism and the adoption of an assertive 
‘Tamil’ national identity. In the process they have tended to lose the confidence of their core 
constituents.  
Social relations are never static, and it is clear that there has been a great deal of change 
in caste relations in Tamil Society, even over the last forty years or so, during which they have 
been observed by the present writer. But for all such important changes as the movements out of 
the villages by members of the Forward Castes, and those from the historically dominant landed 
castes, and – on the other hand – the increased assertiveness of Dalits, there remains intense 
contestation over caste privilege. Caste identities, too, are important repositories of cultural and 
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